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The UK's Implementation of Directive 95/46/EC 405 Schedules 2 and 3, which are conditions of lawful processing under the l s` data protection principle, implement Articles 7 and 8.
Schedule 8 provides transitional exemptions up until 23 October 2007.
Schedule 13 lists modifications to the Act that apply before 23 October 2007 in relation to manual data that are exempt during that period.
The Act itself is supplemented by numerous statutory instruments that have been passed under the Act (22 at the time of writing), the most important of which for the purposes of medical research is The Data Protection (Processing of Sensitive Personal Data) Order 2000, No. 417.
Confidentiality and Common Law
Confidentiality, as a legal duty, has an uncertain basis in common law. ' One could severally or jointly found an obligation of confidence within contract law, the tort of negligence or equity. In the medical context, health care professionals have long recognized an ethical obligation to maintain confidences in order to encourage patient participation and trust. 2 To the extent that this translates into a legal duty, the Courts have preferred to establish a medical practitioner's duty to maintain patient confidence's as an equitable obligation deriving from the public interest rather than a private duty toward the patient.
When is Information
Confidential?
Information is confidential when it is of a confidential nature. This rather circular definition may be derived from a number of cases outside the medical sphere.
3 The common law has fu ther recognized that a confidential relationship of this sort exists between doctor and patient.
4 However, not all forms of information imparted in these circumstances, even where the confidant knows that the information is being provided in confidence, can be classified as confidential, for example, the information might already be public knowledge. 5 This does not mean, of course, that merely because persons other than the confidant know of the confidential information, it may be classified as `public knowledge'. Those other persons may equally be under an obligation of confidence. Furthermore, information which is adequately anonymized cannot be regarded as confidential information. 6 ' See, e. g. R. Wacks, `Breach of Confidence and the Protection of Privacy ' (1977) In terms of medical practice, any health care practitioner working under the auspices of the NHS or other state agency must act in a manner compatible with the Convention. This is due to these institutions being `public authorities' within the meaning of s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. This places an obligation on public bodies, or any person who exercises a function which is public in nature, 10 to act in a manner which is consistent with the Convention. However, processors of medical information who are not employed by bodies whose functions are public in nature do not have a direct duty under the Act. Moreover, medical practitioners, merely by virtue of their registration with the General Medical Council, are not regarded as fulfilling a public function under the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. " An activity essentially of a private character under domestic law, such as the practice of medicine, could not automatically be converted into a public law activity simply because it was subject to administrative authorization and controls by statutorily-based regulatory authorities. However, where the Court is called upon to construe the extent of a duty of confidentiality in any given case, the Court will develop its jurisprudence in line with the Convention. '2 This is because Courts are also `public authorities' within the meaning of s. 6(3)(a) of the Human Rights Act. Consequently, to decide a case in a manner inconsistent with the Convention, or without regard to Strasbourg jurisprudence, 13 would contravene the Act. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the Courts will continue to develop the common law surrounding confidentiality in harmony with rights under the Convention. This should be so even where the confidant is entirely within the private sphere. Finally, confidentiality may be broken where it is in the `public interest' to do so. To this end, the Court must enter into a `balancing exercise' weighing the benefits of disclosure against the detriments of breaching confidence.
In what follows, we will answer the questions posed for the project under various subheadings, and in the process of which we will highlight what we consider to be contentious aspects of the UK's implementation.
Issues in Relation to Data Protection
The Definition of Personal Data
Personal data are defined in Section 1(1) as:
data which relate to a living individual who can be identifieda. from those data or b.
from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely to come into the possession of, the data controller, This implies that, where the data subject can be identified only indirectly from the data, the data are personal (and thus fall under the scope of the Act) only if the data controller can identify the data subject indirectly. This is controversial, because the Directive (Article 2(a)) can be read as stating that data remain personal data if anyone can identify the data subject from it directly or indirectly.
The UK's definition also restricts the scope of the Act to personal data on living individuals. This is controversial as the Directive applies to `natural persons' (see Article 2(a)) and the customary contrast with `natural person' is `legal person' not `deceased person', a contrast which is reflected in Recital 32 of the Directive. When the patient has died, the personal representatives and anyone with a legal claim arising from the death can obtain access to part or all of the patient's health records (officially only those since 1991) under the Access to Health Records Act 1990 c. 23, Section 3.1.
The Effect of Anonymization
The act of anonymization is to some extent a controversial issue in UK law, and the prevailing assumption is that the Data Protection Act does not cover the anonymization of data. There is, however, a substantial argument against this assumption. This argument is presented below, and will ultimately have to be resolved in the Courts. The argument that the act of anonymization will itself be processing of the data, is not without some support from the Information Commissioner:
[i]n anonymising personal data the data controller will be processing such data and, in 20 respect of such processing, will still need to comply with the provisions of the Act.
Bearing in mind that because processing under the Act includes anything that can be done with personal data, anonymization is itself a process, and since Recital 26 of the Directive specifies that the principle of protection must apply to all personal data, the ruling of the High Court in Robertson (made in relation to Section 11 of the Act, which implements Article 14(b) of the Directive) is relevant to this question. Robertson ruled that a data controller who envisages data being processed for a purpose by another to whom the controller discloses the data is to be deemed to be processing the data himself or herself for that purpose. Putting these two things together, it would appear that the Act would require the data subject, B, to be informed of processing by A (the data controller) or C (a third party processor) that will occur only after the data obtained by A from B are rendered completely anonymous. Furthermore, at least where data continue to be held by A in personal form, if A releases non-personal information to C that was Except for the purposes of Section 55 of the Data Protection Act 1998 (s. 55 (7)), unless `the context otherwise requires', obtaining or recording information that is not itself personal data, but which is `to be contained in' personal data, constitutes obtaining or recording personal data. Similarly, using or disclosing information that is not itself personal data, but which is `contained in' personal data, constitutes using or disclosing personal data (s. 1 (2)).
For the purposes of Section 55(4)- (6), "`personal data" includes information extracted from personal data' (s. 55 (7)). (7)) of the Act in doing so (probably because the Act had not come into force at the time of the judgment). With Section 1(2) in mind, this view is odd because it presumes, contrary to what the wording of the Act suggests, that the use of anonymous information contained in personal data is only to be considered use of personal data in the special case (where anonymization would not be in the patient's interests, e. g., because this precludes it being used for the treatment of the patient, for which it was provided). Although Section 55 does not apply to the facts of the Source Informatics case, it is nevertheless relevant to the approach of the Court of Appeal. When Section 55(7) says that Section 1(2) does not apply to Section 55, this means (we suggest) that information contained in personal data is personal data regardless of the context. And, when Section 55 (7) says that `for the purposes of subsections (4) to (6), "personal data" includes information extracted from personal data' this means that, for the purposes of these subsections, information that was abstracted from personal data is personal data even if the data from which it was abstracted no longer exist in personal form (because, if the second clause of Section 55 (7) only applies where the source information is still in personal form, the abstracted information could be said to be contained in personal data, and it would not be necessary for Section 55 (7) The UK Act provides a limited exemption for research, history and statistics in Section 33. The further processing of personal data for these purposes is not to be considered incompatible with the purposes for which the data were obtained, provided that `the relevant conditions'
(which are that the data are not processed to support measures or decisions with respect to particular individuals, and the processing is not likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress to any data subject) are met (s. 33 (1) and (2)). This is an exemption from what the Act describes as the second part of the 2d data protection principle (see Schedule 1
is provided.
Adequate Safeguards
Provided that the relevant conditions are met, Section 33 also exempts processing only for research purposes from the 5th data protection principle (see Schedule 1 Part I; cf. Article 6(1)(e), which requires that personal data are not to be kept for longer than needed for the purposes for which they were originally obtained) (Section 33(3)), and from the duty to provide the data subject with access to the data (see Section 7 of the Act and Article 12(a) of the Directive) where, additionally, the results of the research will not be made available in personal form (Section 33(4)). Since exemption from the Article 6(1)(b) and 6(1)(e) requirements of the Directive is subject to the provision of suitable safeguards and the relevant conditions are the only conditions that need to be satisfied for the exemptions provided from the 2nd and 5th data protection principles, satisfaction of the relevant conditions must be taken to constitute the UK's view of adequate safeguards for these purposes (this also applies to the exemption for research in the substantial of Directive 95/46/EC 411 public interest created by Statutory Instrument 417, paragraph 9). For the purposes of exemption from Section 7, the UK Act's view of adequate legal safeguards (as required by Article 13(2) for exemption from Article 12 requirements) must be taken to be the relevant conditions plus the requirement not to identify the data subject (as specified in Article 13(2)). Furthermore, on a related issue it must be noted that where data have been anonymized, the Commissioner is of the view that safeguards must be in place to prevent reconstitution of the identifiers:
It will be incumbent upon anyone processing data to take such technical and organisational measures as are necessary to ensure that the data cannot be reconstituted to become personal data and to be prepared to justify any decision they make with regard to the processing of the data. 24
In cases other than where personal data are obtained from the data subject, the UK Act exempts from the requirement to provide the data subject with information about the identity of the data controller, etc., if this would require disproportionate effort, the processing is required by a non-contractual legal obligation of the data controller, or any conditions prescribed by the Secretary of State by order are met (Schedule I Part 2 paragraph 3). Such derogation, under such conditions (with research purposes explicitly in mind) is made by the Directive subject to appropriate safeguards (see Article 11(2)). However, in this context, the Act makes no specific provision for safeguards.
Does Preventative Medicine and Medical Diagnosis Cover Medical Research in the UK?
Schedule 3 paragraph 8(1) follows Article 8(3) in removing a prohibition on the processing of data on a person's health where the processing is for medical purposes and is undertaken by a health professional or one operating under an equivalent duty of confidentiality. However, Schedule 3 paragraph 8(2), unlike the Directive, explicitly includes medical research as a medical purpose.
When is there no Risk of Breaching Privacy?
In relation to Article 13(2) of the Directive, which makes research data exempt from the requirement to give access to the data subject on condition, amongst other things, of there being clearly no risk of breaching privacy, it might be tempting to think that the UK law views protection of the data subject's identity as fulfilling this condition. However, non-disclosure of the data subject's identity is an additional explicit requirement of Article 13(2), which implies that the Directive does not consider this to be sufficient. It is possible that the `relevant condition' of the UK law that contains the requirement that processing be unlikely to cause substantial distress to the data subject fulfils this role (at least in part). ... may by order exempt from the subject information provisions, or modify those provisions in relation to, personal data consisting of information as to the physical or mental health or condition of the data subject.
Consequently, the Data Protection (Subject Access Modification) (Health) Order 2000 (SI 2000 No. 413 ) was passed. This provides for restrictions on data subject access to medical records. Furthermore, the Order adds a further exemption to the `third party identification' rules under s. 7(4). Consequently, a data controller is obliged to comply with a subject access request which entails disclosure of information relating to another individual who can be identified from that information, where that other individual falls within the added Section; 7(4)(c).
Furthermore, even where a third party who does not fall within the exemptions laid down in s. 7(4)(a), (b) and (c) has communicated information to the data controller regarding the data subject, s. 7(4) does not operate so as to prevent the data controller from providing any information whatsoever. Quite the reverse. Section 7(5) states:
In subsection (4) the reference to information relating to another individual includes a reference to information identifying that individual as the source of information sought by the request; and that subsection is not to be construed as excusing a data controller from communicating so much of the information sought by the request as can be communicated without disclosing the identity of the other individual concerned, whether by omission of names or other identifying particulars or otherwise. anything done by him in so processing the information shall be taken to be lawfully done despite any obligation of confidence owed by him in respect of it (s. 60(2)(c)).
However, such regulations (which require the approval of both Houses of Parliament) (s64.3) may not make provision requiring the processing of confidential patient information for any purpose if it would be reasonably practicable to achieve that purpose otherwise than pursuant to such regulations, having regard to the cost of and the technology available for achieving that purpose (s. 60 (3)) or for requiring the processing of confidential patient information solely or principally for the purpose of determining the care and treatment to be given to particular individuals (s. 60 (5) The wording here is, at the least, unfortunate, for, read as saying that processing that falls under any regulations passed must be taken to be lawful even if this contravenes the Data Protection Act 1998, Section 60(6) is certainly in contravention of EC law on the assumption that the Act correctly implements Directive 95/46/EC, hence unlawful under the doctrine of the supremacy of EC law. Consequently it must be read as saying no more than that processing that falls under any regulations passed must be taken not to be unlawful on account of being in breach of confidentiality.
More specifically, the problem here is that in order to be lawful under the Data Protection Act 1998, processing must not only not breach confidentiality, but must satisfy Schedules 2 and 3 of the Act (cf. Articles 7 and 8) and the fair processing provisions of Schedule 1 Part II paragraphs 2 and 3 (cf. Articles 10 and 11). With this in mind, it might be thought that, in practice, regulations passed under the Act will be compatible with the Directive if they satisfy Section 60(3) of the Act, on the grounds that if it is reasonably impracticable to achieve the objectives of the regulations by other means (specifically by obtaining the consent/non-objection of the patient) then it will not be necessary to obtain consent/non-objection.
However, in relation to Schedule 2 (cf. Article 7) it must be noted that reasonable impracticability is not stated to be a condition of permitting the processing of confidential patient information (only of requiring processing), which also raises questions about the compatibility of the Act with the European Convention on Human Rights, with which the Act was declared to be compatible by the Secretary of State. In relation to the fair processing provisions (Articles 10 and 11), it must be noted that only the Act, not the Directive, makes information provision (which is necessary for there to be any opportunity to object) subject to practicability in the Article 10 case. ' Furthermore, insofar as the basis of any regulations (see s. 60(l )) is that processing is to be permitted/required in the public interest, attention must be drawn to Article 14(a) of the Directive, which requires the right to object to be removed by national legislation if the public interest is to be the basis of legitimate processing under Article 7 (cf. Schedule 2). It is at least questionable that this right can be removed implicitly.
Indeed, given the structure of Section 10 of the Data Protection Act 1998, it is arguable that it can only be removed by regulations made under the 1998 Act (specifically under s. (10)(2)(b)), which have not been made). It should be noted also that, although Article 13.1 permits Member States to modify the obligations and rights provided by Articles 6(1), 10,11(1), 12 and 21 for the rights of others, and medical research arguably protects the rights of others, the Health and Social Care Act does not purport to modify any of these obligations and rights. and Regulation 2 paragraph (4), according to which,
Where the Secretary of State considers that it is necessary in the public interest that confidential patient information is processed for a purpose specified in paragraph (1), he may give notice to any person who is approved and authorized under paragraph (3) to require that person to process that information for that purpose and any such notice may require that the information is processed forthwith or within such period as is specified in the notice.
We find this Regulation difficult to interpret. If the word `includes' in paragraph (2) has the meaning that it normally has, then the activities in paragraph (1) are not subject to paragraph (2). Instead, all that paragraph (2) does is to indicate that processing to set up a database for, for example, medical research, is itself to be considered processing for medical research. To make processing under paragraph (1) subject to paragraph (2) it is necessary to read `includes' as `comprises'. The effect of this is that only activities of or for, for example, cancer registries for the purposes of paragraph (1) (e. g, medical research approved by a research ethics committee (REC)) are covered by paragraph (1) itself. However, while this fits the explanatory note, according to which `Regulation 2 makes provision relating to the processing of patient information in connection with the construction and maintenance of databases by bodies (known as "cancer registries")', it needs to be noted that paragraph (1) appears to contrast `comprise'
with `include', though it is not absolutely impossible that `or' be read here as considers processing for purposes under paragraph (1) to be `necessary in the public interest') to require those who may process confidential patient information to process the confidential patient information (individuals and actions that are subject to conditions by paragraph (1) being `subject to' paragraphs (2) and (3) and Regulation 7).
Regulation 5 permits confidential patient information to be processed for medical research in the circumstances set out in the Schedule to the Regulations, which are:
1. in the process of making this information less identifiable, 2. processing relating to present or past geographical locations required for research into the locations at which disease/other medical conditions may occur, 3. processing which enables the lawful holder to identify and contact patients to obtain consent in relation to research on them, their information, or their samples, 4.
processing for medical purposes to link information, validate quality or avoid impairment of quality, 5.
for audit, monitoring or analysis of the provision of patient care and services by health service, or 6. to grant access for one or more of these purposes, if the processing is approved by both the Secretary of State and an REC, subject to Regulation 7 restrictions and exclusions, which are:
1. He or she shall not process that information more than necessary to achieve the purposes (Reg. 7.1).
2.
As far as practical, remove any unneeded particulars (Reg. 7.1(a)), ensure no access is allowed to persons not involved in the processing (Reg. 7.1 (b)) and appropriate technical and organizational measures are taken to prevent unauthorized processing (Reg. 7.1 (c) states that consent of the data subject is necessary for legitimate processing or that explicit consent is necessary for the processing of sensitive personal data. Consent (Schedule 2) or explicit consent (Schedule 3) is simply listed as one of a number of conditions that can satisfy the relevant Schedule. However, because Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires all UK legislation to be interpreted so as to be compatible with Articles 2-12 and 14 (as read through Articles 16-18) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) if it is possible to do so, it is arguable that consent must be obtained for the processing of sensitive personal data unless conditions that would satisfy a breach of Article 8(1) of the ECHR (as listed in Article 8(2) of the ECHR) are satisfied. (That is to say, the other conditions listed in Articles 7 and 8 may only be appealed to in circumstances in which a derogation under Article 8(2) ECHR applies). This is because Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires the UK Courts to take account of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. However, in, for example, MS v Sweden, it is clear that the European Court of Human Rights considers the processing of any data on a person's health without consent to engage Article 8(1) ECHR and require a justification in terms of Article 8(2) of the Convention. And while neither the UK Act nor the Directive explicitly states that consent must take lexical priority, neither instrument says anything that precludes such an interpretation, which renders an interpretation of lexical priority for consent possible in the terms of the Human Rights Act 1998.
The Commissioner is of the view that, whilst consent is not a prerequisite for processing of medical information under the 1998 Act per se, the Act nevertheless places a duty on data controllers to process data `lawfully' (Sch. 1, Part 1, para. 1). Consequently, health care information will be subject to requirements of common law confidentiality.
There are three general exemptions to the duty of confidence:
where there is a legal compulsion, an overriding public duty, or with consent. 26
Consent under common law requires three things; to be informed, the person giving it has choice, and an indication the individual has given his or her consent. 27
National Identification Number Schedule 1 Part II paragraph 4 of the UK Act makes provision for the Secretary of State by order to specify when personal data may be fairly and lawfully processed using a `general identifier', as required by Article 8(7) of the Directive. However, despite the fact that Article 8(7) states that `Member States shall determine the conditions under which a national identification number or any other identifier of general application may be processed', no Order has been issued. This failure can surely only be legitimate if Article 8(7) may be interpreted as giving Member States discretion to specify that there are no conditions limiting the processing of personal data by use of a general identifier.
Is there Removal of the Right to Object?
Section 10 of the UK Act (implementing Article 14(a) of the Directive) grants a right to prevent processing likely to cause substantial damage or distress.
`Substantial, unwarranted damage/distress' has been interpreted by the Commissioner as follows:
It is for a court to decide in each case whether the damage or distress is substantial and unwarranted. The Commissioner takes the view that a data subject notice is, therefore, only likely to be appropriate where the particular processing has caused, or is likely to cause, someone to suffer loss or harm, or upset and anguish of a real nature, over and above annoyance level, and without justification. 28
This right does not apply (s. 10(2)) when processing is with the consent of the data subject, for the purposes of a contract of the data subject, necessary for a noncontractual legal obligation of the data controller, or in the vital interests of the data subject. It does apply where processing is to be rendered legitimate in the public interest or as necessary for the legitimate interests of the data controller, and no provision is made in the Act for removal of this right. where such notice in writing has been received but the data controller does not have sufficient information about the individual in order readily to determine whether he is processing personal data about that individual, the data controller shall send to the individual a written notice stating that he cannot provide the information set out in paragraph 2(3) of that Part because of his inability to make that determination, and explaining the reasons for that inability.
Article 5(2) conditions must also be met: the data controller shall, record the reasons for his view that the prim condition referred to in [paragraph 3(2)(a) of Schedule I Part II of the 1998 Act is met in respect of the data.
Simplification to Notification
If the data which form the basis for the medical research are `non-automated accessible records' then there need be no notification to the Commissioner. There is also an exemption under Schedule 8, Part IV, paras. 15-17 up to the 24 October 1998, but only in relation to historical research, not medical research. Otherwise, there are no special provisions for notification regarding medical research (unless the data are anonymized, in which case the data are no longer personal data).
Prior Checking
Section 22(2) requires the Information Commissioner to subject `assessable processing', which is processing that (see s. 22(1)) is specified by order of the Secretary of State to be particularly likely `to cause substantial harm or substantial distress to data subjects' or `otherwise significantly to prejudice the rights and freedoms of data subjects' to prior checks. However, no such orders have, as yet, A request may be made to the Commissioner by or on behalf of any person who is, or believes himself to be, directly affected by any processing of personal data for an assessment as to whether it is likely or unlikely that the processing has been carried out in compliance with the provisions of this Act.
A data subject has a right to be informed by a data controller of the processing of personal data relating to him (or her) (Section 7), and rights to serve notices on a data controller requiring the data controller to:
i. cease, or not to begin, processing, or processing for a specified purpose or in a specified manner, any personal data in respect of which he is the data subject on the ground of substantial damage or distress being caused or likely to be cause to `him or to another' (s. 10(1));
ii. cease or not begin processing of data in respect of which he is the data subject for purposes of direct marketing (s. 11); iii. ensure that no decision that significantly affects the data subject is based solely on processing by automatic means (s. 12).
If the data controller fails to comply with any one of these requests or notices then the data subject may apply to the High Court or a county Court (or, in Scotland, the Court of Session or the sheriff (s. 7(9); s. 10(4); s. 11(2); s. 12(8); s. 15)).
An individual who suffers damage by reason of any contravention of the Act may bring an action for damages in these Courts (s. 13, s. 15). The Act does not provide for third parties to bring contraventions to the notice of the Commissioner or to take action in the Courts. This means that RECs do not have standing under the Act to bring proceedings per se, save perhaps in the it can be seen that whether there is adequacy can, at least partly, be in the hands of the UK data controller. The data controller might limit the types of data transferred, the types of organisation they are transferred to or insist, whether through a contract or otherwise, on the recipient meeting certain conditions. 31
The Information Commissioner states that there are several different types of contract that can be used to ensure adequate protection. These are: those based on standard terms agreed by either the EC (most common) or those agreed solely by the Information Commissioner (rare), contracts drawn-up by the data controller, or one-off arrangements authorized by the IC (also rare). Contracts drawn-up by the data controller will not be checked by the IC unless in exceptional circumstances, they can be used to `plug the gaps' of adequacy or when the controller is in no position (or does not want) to judge adequacy themselves. (4)) and comply with it (s. 54(6)). In comparison, the European Commission may make a decision under Article 25(6) that a third country provides adequate protection for the fundamental rights and freedoms covered by the Directive. In such a case there is no specific provision in the UK legislation to act on the decision, though such a decision of the EC may be relevant information for dissemination to data controllers by the Information Commissioner under the general duty in Section 51(6)(c) of the 1998 Act.
The Supervisory Authority J"
Medical research and the use of medical data is not treated as a special sector with its own supervisory authority. The use of personal data for medical research is dealt with directly by the Information Commissioner.
The powers given to the supervisory authority include those outlined below:
To receive requests by or on behalf of any person who is, or believes himself to be, directly affected by any processing of personal data for an assessment as to whether it is likely or unlikely that the processing has been or is being A judge can issue a warrant so the Commissioner can search premises, to inspect, examine, operate and test any equipment found there which is used or intended to be used for the processing of personal data (Schedule 9). The Information Commissioner can also seize data.
In some cases, it authorizes processing (Section 53), and Court proceedings should be enacted by the Commissioner (Article 60).
Penalties for Infringement
Apart from direct recourse to a Court on the application of the data subject (see section above on standing to bring breaches to the attention of the supervisory authority), the Act provides for the following measures to ensure implementation of the provisions of the Directive. The Information Commissioner may: 
